I think that your way of dividing it up between the Observer and the World is OK, but it's just one way of describing what's going on. What the brain is doing is very complex, and I don't really think it admits of simple explanations. But, with that said, your description is perhaps as good as many others I've read, such as Global Workspace Theory or what have you. All of these ways of describing it can be true to a certain extent at the same time, even if they look like different descriptions.
But the way you write, it seems like you feel you've got The Answer and everyone else is deluded. I'm not sure this attitude is justified. For one thing, your description doesn't seem to me to do very much work towards explaining consciousness, and for another, I don't think everyone else deserves such scorn even if mistakes are being made.
In denying Observer, I take you to be making something like a Buddhist or Humean point that the self is not real. This is OK by me, to a point. I don't think there's any robust essential self or ghost in the machine, but I think you can interpret the information processing being performed by the brain as something of a self, in which case the self exists insofar as the brain processes information. If you're saying that there is no sharp delineation between the self and its environment, then that's also OK by me.
It doesn't seem to me that science assumes that an essential self exists, or that there is a sharp delineation between the self and the environment, so I'm not sure what you mean when you say that science takes Observer as axiomatic. Can you give an example? Sure, some individual scientists may make questionable assumptions from time to time, but science as a discipline tends not to make metaphysical claims like these. Science perhaps assumes that we can consider certain phenomena from certain observer perspectives (perhaps most easily illustrated by the reference frames we talk about in relativity), but I wouldn't take any of this kind of stuff to be implying that essential selves exist.
I guess overall my problem with your post is that it doesn't seem actionable. If I were a neuroscientist or cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind I wouldn't know how to interpret your advice or what you would have me do differently. OK, Observer is a construct. Now what?
Thank you for your reply and I hear what you're saying. The piece was written in something of a childlike fit of pique. And no doubt I could have expressed myself better.
However, I do see actionable points in the sense that it's clear to me, when I consider the rise of Panpsychism for example, that many, many commentators are still using an intuitive model of self and attempting to fit phenomena to it. "Is the thermostat conscious" to me implies "of course I am conscious! Consciousness is a property."
In a sense, to me this justifies my posturing in the article, in that this is usually, on behalf of the believer, a simple personal ego issue (attachment) and prodding can help.
I agree that this doesn't really move the debate about consciousness forwards. But the way I see it, all these great minds (and I'm being sincere) could better work if they can better get this observer issue out of the way.
Dennett is more or less an illusionist. You should read Consciousness Explained if you haven’t.
I agree nothing would be lost if my body was replaced with a materially identical copy. But I think a lot of researchers share these views. Just not all. I don’t think this is really holding the field back, because I think illusionism has largely dissolved the problem already. Just because there is no consensus doesn’t mean that the solution isn’t known.
The trouble is that at root it’s a conceptual problem. Science will never resolve the problem because it isn’t really a scientific problem at all. But there’s still lots of scientific work to do in solving the so-called “easy problems”.
What I've witnessed with the Transporter dilemma is many materialists claiming that of course they would travel like this, but IMO then going straight back to behaving as though something is being lost in how they formulate notions.
This, coupled with numerous panpsychist threads where whether teacups or thermostats "are conscious" is being ardently discussed, gives me cause to believe that most people in this field profess to be clear but their thinking betrays them.
I guess this is where we disagree. I think it is still a big issue in the scene. I could be wrong.
It seems to me that further investigation of the issues around observers and identity could still yield a great deal. I'm not these days convinced that science, or perhaps math, can't get there. I could well be wrong here.
I feel that if we had a working model of Parfit's Transporter then this would move consciousness research on leaps and bounds. I feel I see researchers constantly behaving as though there is something that would be lost if their body was replaced with a materially identical copy.
The 'materially identical copy' idea is a powerful thought experiment, but considering the limitations of QM, the incalculable nuance of "brain states", etc, it seems impossible *even in theory* (much less in practice) to make a copy, which seems to make it not a great thought experiment in the end. Wouldn't it be even more interesting to consider how an almost-perfect material copy of oneself would behave? Would it be "close" to "you" and coherent, or would it be some scrambled mess (psychologically)? Replicating the material body also means replicating the impulses acting on it (internal and external) at the moment of copying- probably extra orders of magnitude of complexity and chances for mishaps.
[Not trying to be pedantic, but the 'identical copy' thought experiment bugs me!]
I hear what you're saying. I mean, the idea of this thought experiment is to test how materialist someone's viewpoint really is. Do you believe someone is dying when the button is pushed. According to materialism... No!
I think that your way of dividing it up between the Observer and the World is OK, but it's just one way of describing what's going on. What the brain is doing is very complex, and I don't really think it admits of simple explanations. But, with that said, your description is perhaps as good as many others I've read, such as Global Workspace Theory or what have you. All of these ways of describing it can be true to a certain extent at the same time, even if they look like different descriptions.
But the way you write, it seems like you feel you've got The Answer and everyone else is deluded. I'm not sure this attitude is justified. For one thing, your description doesn't seem to me to do very much work towards explaining consciousness, and for another, I don't think everyone else deserves such scorn even if mistakes are being made.
In denying Observer, I take you to be making something like a Buddhist or Humean point that the self is not real. This is OK by me, to a point. I don't think there's any robust essential self or ghost in the machine, but I think you can interpret the information processing being performed by the brain as something of a self, in which case the self exists insofar as the brain processes information. If you're saying that there is no sharp delineation between the self and its environment, then that's also OK by me.
It doesn't seem to me that science assumes that an essential self exists, or that there is a sharp delineation between the self and the environment, so I'm not sure what you mean when you say that science takes Observer as axiomatic. Can you give an example? Sure, some individual scientists may make questionable assumptions from time to time, but science as a discipline tends not to make metaphysical claims like these. Science perhaps assumes that we can consider certain phenomena from certain observer perspectives (perhaps most easily illustrated by the reference frames we talk about in relativity), but I wouldn't take any of this kind of stuff to be implying that essential selves exist.
I guess overall my problem with your post is that it doesn't seem actionable. If I were a neuroscientist or cognitive scientist or philosopher of mind I wouldn't know how to interpret your advice or what you would have me do differently. OK, Observer is a construct. Now what?
Thank you for your reply and I hear what you're saying. The piece was written in something of a childlike fit of pique. And no doubt I could have expressed myself better.
However, I do see actionable points in the sense that it's clear to me, when I consider the rise of Panpsychism for example, that many, many commentators are still using an intuitive model of self and attempting to fit phenomena to it. "Is the thermostat conscious" to me implies "of course I am conscious! Consciousness is a property."
In a sense, to me this justifies my posturing in the article, in that this is usually, on behalf of the believer, a simple personal ego issue (attachment) and prodding can help.
I agree that this doesn't really move the debate about consciousness forwards. But the way I see it, all these great minds (and I'm being sincere) could better work if they can better get this observer issue out of the way.
Is your view illusionism then? Because I’m on board with that
I'm not sure. I have only listened to one of Keith's podcasts on the subject. Is there a definitive description somewhere?
Dennett is more or less an illusionist. You should read Consciousness Explained if you haven’t.
I agree nothing would be lost if my body was replaced with a materially identical copy. But I think a lot of researchers share these views. Just not all. I don’t think this is really holding the field back, because I think illusionism has largely dissolved the problem already. Just because there is no consensus doesn’t mean that the solution isn’t known.
The trouble is that at root it’s a conceptual problem. Science will never resolve the problem because it isn’t really a scientific problem at all. But there’s still lots of scientific work to do in solving the so-called “easy problems”.
Yes, I have read CE.
What I've witnessed with the Transporter dilemma is many materialists claiming that of course they would travel like this, but IMO then going straight back to behaving as though something is being lost in how they formulate notions.
This, coupled with numerous panpsychist threads where whether teacups or thermostats "are conscious" is being ardently discussed, gives me cause to believe that most people in this field profess to be clear but their thinking betrays them.
I guess this is where we disagree. I think it is still a big issue in the scene. I could be wrong.
It seems to me that further investigation of the issues around observers and identity could still yield a great deal. I'm not these days convinced that science, or perhaps math, can't get there. I could well be wrong here.
I feel that if we had a working model of Parfit's Transporter then this would move consciousness research on leaps and bounds. I feel I see researchers constantly behaving as though there is something that would be lost if their body was replaced with a materially identical copy.
The 'materially identical copy' idea is a powerful thought experiment, but considering the limitations of QM, the incalculable nuance of "brain states", etc, it seems impossible *even in theory* (much less in practice) to make a copy, which seems to make it not a great thought experiment in the end. Wouldn't it be even more interesting to consider how an almost-perfect material copy of oneself would behave? Would it be "close" to "you" and coherent, or would it be some scrambled mess (psychologically)? Replicating the material body also means replicating the impulses acting on it (internal and external) at the moment of copying- probably extra orders of magnitude of complexity and chances for mishaps.
[Not trying to be pedantic, but the 'identical copy' thought experiment bugs me!]
I hear what you're saying. I mean, the idea of this thought experiment is to test how materialist someone's viewpoint really is. Do you believe someone is dying when the button is pushed. According to materialism... No!